# The danger of fake news for Common Security and Defence Policy

Essay

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# Abstract

The main objective of this paper is to investigate the phenomenon of "fake news" and analyse it from the perspective of reporting a concrete situation in a direct relationship with European security. After defining the concepts of disinformation/misinformation and the role of "fake news" in creating a false reality, we specified the current state of research at the EU level and identified the missing piece of the puzzle. Starting from the established research question, *"How are the European institutions involved in combating the spread of fake news?"*, the present paper focuses on a comprehensive analysis of the measures taken at the European Union level, through the European Parliament and the European External Action Service. The emphasis is laid on the major vehicle for spreading fake news, the EUvsDisinfo tool, and on how the Parliament is trying to combat the negative effects caused by the disinformation process. The paper concludes with a presentation of the discussions and pros and cons regarding all the data and measures addressed in the previous chapters.

**Keywords**: disinformation, misinformation, "fake news", security, defence

# 1. Table of Contents

## 2. Preface

Although I am young and I have not managed to gain too much professional experience, and not having directly been confronted with the "fake news" phenomenon, being only a military student in the process of training to ensure national defence and maintain national and international security (especially in terms of my country's membership in various multilateral cooperation structures, including the EU), I understand, however, the vicious consequences of this phenomenon. The first example I can think of can only be the situation created by Russia's "special military operation" against an independent and sovereign state, Ukraine.

The concept of "fake news" refers to a phenomenon increasingly present today in everyday life, which seems to have a special penetrating force in all fields of activity, including defence and security, both nationally and internationally. Its ubiquity and especially the sometimes deeply disruptive and destabilizing effects on a state require an adequate management of the phenomenon, through the use of specific capabilities.

On the other hand, "fake news" targets both the general public and decision-making structures. As this practice expands, the concept becomes more challenging for the policy/intelligence analyst, and for the researcher in the field. For example, there is a fine line between fake news, manipulation, propaganda, and disinformation. The major vehicle for "fake news" is mass media, including today's most important media instruments (e.g. the Internet).

Consequently, the citizens of the European Union, including myself, have had the opportunity to understand and even experience the effects of fake news on national and community efforts and projects to build a harmonious world, generating benefits for individuals, states, and the organization itself. The realism of our thinking analyses the situation from the perspective of the various resources needed to bring peace and security to the European continent. Optimism tells us that we can benefit from such a dramatic event by intervening in development policies and programs, including in the field of security and defence and the harmful, sometimes disastrous influence of fake news can be mitigated.

As a European citizen, but coming from a geopolitical space that cannot be denied its totalitarian past, I learned from my readings, as well as from discussions with my grandparents, that the Romanian people were subjected to various propaganda and

disinformation actions. We have learned that we have survived turbulent times, finding within ourselves the strength to move forward and build a world of freedom and truth.

Therefore, a culture of security is needed, both at the level of the public and at the level of decision-making institutions and structures, in terms of combating the disastrous effects that may occur due to the "fake news" phenomenon.

# 3. Introduction

The phenomenon of "fake news" in military actions is not a new one; it has accompanied humanity since the first confrontation. The great military strategist Sun Tzu himself states in his work, *The Art of War*, that among warring forces, deception, and trickery are needed to achieve victory: *"All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him"*[1]. It can be stated, therefore, that to gain an advantage over enemy forces, a disorder created against them is necessary (e.g. misleading, manipulating the truth or hiding it, transmitting false information, etc.).

This phenomenon is also encountered in hybrid warfare. Regarding the definition of this type of war, there are several approaches. Historians see it as: *"the concurrent use of conventional and irregular forces in the same military campaign"*[2], while Frank Hoffman defines it as: *"different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder, conducted by both sides and a variety of non-state actors."*[3]

We are in the 21st century, a world and a way of life dedicated to evolution. Humanity has developed from many points of view, advanced technology being the main "attraction" nowadays. Today's modern equipment is a good way of informing and a faster "vehicle" for spreading news, including fake ones.

To understand the process of disinformation, a definition is needed. Disinformation is *"false or misleading content that is spread to deceive or secure economic or political gain, and which may cause public harm."*[4]. Therefore, disinformation is an action with negative effects that aims to mislead people, both by influencing public opinion and by hiding the truth. The phenomenon of "fake news" is a tactic aimed at dividing a people, and making them lose confidence in the leader of the state and not only. Moreover, other

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[1] Sun Tzu. (2013). The Art of War. London. HarperCollins Publishers. P. 3.
[2] Lt. Cantwell. D. & Iasiello & E.J. & Cmdr. Jezewski R. & Naydenov M. & Col. Neal J. & Pernik P., Voyger M. & Wither J.K. & Col. Worthan R.L.(2020). per Concordiam. Germany. Volume 10, issue 1, P. 7.
[3] Ibid. P. 7-8.
[4] Homepage of European Commission. URL: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/online-disinformatio. [25-10-23].

terms belong to the same "lexical field" of disinformation, such as misinformation, which is *"false or misleading content shared without harmful intent though the effects can still be harmful."*[5].

Commenting in parallel on the two terms present in the actions caused by the phenomenon of "fake news", i.e. disinformation and misinformation, from the perspective of the European Union, it can be seen that false information is a common feature, the difference being made only by the intention behind it.

Therefore, in an increasingly complex security context, it is essential to be aware of the importance of having a common security and defence policy, promoting security culture and prevention, and encouraging a proactive rather than a reactive attitude.

[5] Ibid.

## 4. Current State of Research

The European Union, made up of 27 Member States, is a political and economic union that operates based on standardized laws applied in all member countries. The objectives of the European Union are divided into two categories: internally (within the common space of the European Union) and externally. As regards the first category, the objectives include promoting peace and technical progress, creating an internal market, etc., while internationally, the focus is on respecting international law and promoting solidarity between peoples. Summing up the objectives, values, and principles on which the European Union is founded projects a world of justice and truth, a world in which the rights and freedoms of individuals are respected.

The process of disinformation is a real challenge for the security of the European Union. Documents related to combating the spread of fake news are built based on thorough analyses so that combating disinformation is as effective and fast as possible. The values of European Parliament are under threat due to fake news. The European institutions are involved in combating fake news precisely to preserve the values on which the European construction was built and to ensure its endurance.

Currently, at the 2018 initiative of the European Commission, a policy of action has been launched to combat the phenomenon of "fake news", which proposes 3 "courses of action"[6]:

- *Responsible and sustainable cooperation between platforms and public authorities*
- *Towards a more proactive media policy*
- *Empowering and supporting end users*

The first idea, which suggests cooperation between online platforms and public authorities, is based on *"the creation of a black list of banned advertisers and media outlets."* [7] This would mean highlighting unsafe online platforms for access, so citizens know where not to get information from. The second idea, adopting a proactive policy, proposes developing exposure to minority content: *"To the contrary, EU media policy seems to be in strong need of developing co-regulatory solutions to increase the*

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[6] Renda, A. (2018). The legal framework to address "fake news": possible policy actions at the EU level. Directorate-General for Internal Policies. P. 25-27.
[7] Renda, A. (2018). Ibid. P. 25.

*"exposure" of non-majoritarian content, and thus to proactively, rather than reactively, support pluralism."* [8] Finally, the third idea comes in direct support for the citizens of the European Union, through two methods.

Moreover, the European Union has developed a plan against disinformation, composed of four actions[9]:

- *Improve detection, analysis, and exposure of disinformation*
- *Stronger cooperation and joint responses to disinformation*
- *Mobilise private sector to tackle disinformation*
- *Raise awareness and improve societal resilience*

Therefore, the action plan against the phenomenon of "fake news" developed at the European Union level, envisages the creation of a safer world that will be less vulnerable to the catastrophic effects of disinformation, whether at national or international level.

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[8] Renda, A. (2018). Ibid. P. 27.
[9] Action Plan Against Disinformation. (2019).

# 5. Research Gap

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the European Union has faced various disinformation activities over time. The EU has acknowledged this threat and set up various programs, codes, tactics, etc. regarding the security and defence of the institution against the phenomenon of "fake news".

From my point of view, the existence and promotion of a security culture is a first step in terms of combating the negative effects caused by the "fake news" phenomenon. It is very important for the younger generations, and not only, to be aware of the importance of using official information sources, which can be easily identified. The vast majority of us have access to the Internet, which means that we have all the resources we need in the process of combating disinformation and its spread. In other words, through information programs for all categories of individuals, security culture can be understood as a tool to prevent fake news and reduce the impact of this phenomenon on the security of European nations, and on the security of the European Union.

Whether we refer to young people in schools or to experienced adults, the awareness of promoting security culture could be both the solution to the mechanism for spreading fake news and the "foundation" of a personal shield against the disastrous effects caused by disinformation. The present is about learning from the past so that we know how to exploit the opportunities and challenges brought about by an uncertain future.

# 6. Research Question

In terms of eliminating the danger and negative effects caused by the phenomenon of "fake news", the process will not be an easy one, being influenced by several factors. The online space, accessible to most categories of individuals in the 21$^{st}$ century, is the easiest way to spread rumours. Through their mass distribution, they can achieve official news status. In a very short period, rumours can be considered real threats to the security and defence of the European Union.

One concrete situation that has caused significant damage in all areas of activity and that has strongly influenced the European Union is represented by the "special military operation" unleashed in the Eastern European space, between Russia and Ukraine. An unforeseen situation, extensively fuelled by untruths and misinformation, visible on all television channels, social networks, etc., has caused great signs of uncertainty for the entire global population. Thus, the main question underlying the unfavourable situation caused by the war between two states with the same origins is: *"How are the European institutions involved in combating the spread of fake news?"*

As a first step, it is necessary to identify the Russian-induced spread in terms of the extent of the disinformation process caused by the conflict in which the country is involved (through social media platforms). Moreover, we must be aware that the conflict situation taking place in Eastern Europe has resulted in many negative effects for the Ukrainian people, who have been subjected to many disinformation campaigns initiated by the Russian state. Last but not least, the analysis of the procedures by which the European Union "fights" against this adverse situation started in February 2022 is essential in terms of the involvement of every citizen in combating the disinformation process.

# 7. Methodology

Starting from the main question, regarding the action of the European institutions in combating the phenomenon of "fake news", and also highlighting the importance of the topic I chose to document and discuss in this paper, I decided to focus my attention on the documents elaborated by the European Parliament, which represents the legislative power in this context, in order to identify the measures taken in the fight against disinformation. This is how I understand the effort of this European institution in combating this menacing phenomenon. To this aim, I will analyse the tool launched by the European External Action Service, "EUvsDisinfo", and the reports published at the initiative of the European Union on detecting interference and manipulation of information from an unknown environment.

In addition, I have tried to analyse the events since the beginning of the Russian-Ukraine war, in order to shed more light on how the disinformation process is capable of producing such overarching disasters. As I have mentioned in previous chapters, social networks represent one of the easiest ways to spread news, whether true or false.

# 8. Research and Results of Research

## 8.1. Social media – the major vehicle for spreading the news

The 21$^{st}$ century is on ascending trend in what regards technological innovation. If a few decades ago people used a sheet of paper and a pen to keep in touch with each other even at great distances, nowadays, this process has been simplified by the existence of social networks. No matter where we are, platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, Telegram, Twitter, etc., help us keep the connection between us alive, but sometimes take us away from reality, "teleporting" us to a virtual world, gradually devoid of humanity and feelings.

This paper aims to discuss mechanisms related to the spread of fake news in the European Union and identify solutions to combat this phenomenon. To this aim, I chose to analyze the impact of disinformation through social media platforms.

Being aware of the negative consequences of the disinformation process, the European Union has developed several action plans, codes, tactics, etc., to combat these negative effects. Among the responsibilities of Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for the Internal Market within the European Union, *"strengthening EU tools to prevent and counter disinformation and fake information online, while preserving freedom of expression, freedom of the press and media pluralism"*[10] is one of the most important.

Breton's study shows that there are 19 large-scale online platforms, including those mentioned earlier (Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc.). In the European Union's view, these *"search engines"*[11] have become *"systemically relevant and have special responsibilities to make the Internet a safe and trustworthy space."*[12] There are 4 objectives behind this finding:

- Greater protection, control, and choice for their users
- Stronger protection for minors online
- More diligent and trustworthy content moderation, less illegal content, and less disinformation online
- More transparency and accountability

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[10] Homepage of European Commission. URL: https://commissioners.ec.europa.eu/thierry-breton_en#responsibilities. [29-10-23].
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.

It can be noted that the European Union is aware of the great potential and capacity of social networks in terms of security against the disinformation process, which is why online platforms *"will be obliged to adapt their recommender system to prevent algorithmic amplification of disinformation."*[13]

A concrete case about social networks and news distribution is represented by the ultimatum received by the owner of the online platform Twitter, Elon Musk, who was ordered *"to censor so-called 'disinformation' or face being sanctioned under the Digital Services Act (DSA)."*[14]



**Figure 1**: Post shared by Thierry Breton regarding illegal content shared on Twitter.[15]

In the example above, it can be seen that the online platform Twitter has been used to spread illegal content within the European Union. Thus, Thierry Breton formulated a message to Elon Musk, in asking him to be vigilant and careful about distributing false information and to take action against such practices (image below).



**Figure 2**: Excerpt from the letter signed by Thierry Breton for Elon Musk[16]

The billionaire's response came quite fast. He stated that the platform's policy promotes transparent content and is an open source for everybody (image below).



**Figure 3**: Elon Musk's response to Thierry Breton's request[17]

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Homepage of Brussels Signal. URL: https://brusselssignal.eu/2023/10/eu-threatens-musk-with-ultimatum-to-censor-disinformation-on-x/. [30-10-23].

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

Therefore, one of the objectives of the European Union highlights a measure related to the prevention of the phenomenon of "fake news", with the help of the prevention system regarding the algorithm of the disinformation process. In my opinion, social networks are not only a major vehicle for spreading information content, as I have argued in previous lines, but also a "virtual battlefield" between influential people who have power over ordinary citizens.

## 8.2. The EU's tool to tackle fake news

At the initiative of the European External Action Service, a tool was designed and developed to combat disinformation in the armed conflict taking place in Eastern Europe, namely the EUvsDisinfo. This is a database that *"has collected more than 5000 individual cases of disinformation targeting Ukraine."*[18] It can thus be seen that Ukraine has been subjected to a huge number of cases of disinformation even before the start of the war.

EUvsDisinfo is open to all citizens who want to keep up to date with the unfavourable situation between Russia and Ukraine. In this chapter, I intend to analyze the data collected by this platform, so that the situation Ukraine is going through be better understood, from the perspective of a reality that promotes truth and integrity.

It is essential to understand that this "machinery" designed to expand the phenomenon of "fake news" unleashed by Russia did not start at the beginning of this "special military operation" against Ukraine. The truth is that Russia made its desire felt for specific trends in the field of spreading false information content almost 10 years ago: *"The Kremlin's information manipulation and disinformation attacks on Ukraine began long before the start of the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022."*[19]

Next, I will present some info graphics related to disinformation and the spread of propaganda by Russia against Ukraine. We will comment on Russia's sham referendums, its hostility and disinformation aimed at the aggressed state, and leader Vladimir Putin's hateful words towards the Ukrainian people. All of these occurred in 2022 and took place in the regions occupied by Russian power in Ukraine. Following

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[17] Ibid.
[18] Homepage of European Union. URL: https://european-union.europa.eu/priorities-and-actions/eu-support-ukraine_en. [30-10-23].
[19] Homepage of EUvsDisinfo. URL: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ukraine/. [30-10-23].

some analyses, the referendums were a red flag, signalling one of Russia's fighting options, through the use of nuclear weapons and not only.

First of all, the fake referendum supported by Russia did not meet the conditions of a fair referendum, which should be based on citizens' freedom, democracy, national constitution, access to information, the right to vote, etc. In the figure below, we can observe outmatches in terms of the image of a fair referendum. Moreover, the Russian leader's statement that the majority will make a difference is untrue, since citizens were forced to vote.



**Figure 4**: Comparison between a real referendum and a sham referendum[20]

Secondly, the process of disinformation and spreading false information about Ukraine is another tactic of Russia, practiced since 2014, when the latter attempted an illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The figure below illustrates this fact.



**Figure 5**: Initial moment of the disinformation process triggered by Russia against Ukraine[21]

Moreover, in the years that have passed, Russia's main objective revolved around the annexation of the territory of the Crimean Peninsula, which resulted in numerous military actions aimed to destabilize the Ukrainian forces. Some of the false narratives produced by Russia can be seen in the image below.

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[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.

**Figure 6**: Cases of spreading fake news at Russia's initiative[22]

Thirdly, Vladimir Putin, the leader of the Russian people, along with other leaders in charge of the country, firmly express ideas and conceptions full of hatred and malice towards the Ukrainian state, a former member of the USSR, alongside Russia.



**Figure 7**: Kremlin leader's harsh words to Ukraine[23]

In sum, the armed conflict between Russia and Ukraine, both former member states of the USSR, has generated another type of conflict, built on disinformation, propaganda, and the spreading of untrue information, all of which is aimed to induce chaos, disorder, and destabilization among citizens and impacting their own national and patriotic values.

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[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.

## 8.3. Voice of the European Institutions vs. "fake news"

Being aware of Russia's specific propaganda attacks, the European Union has prepared to fight this phenomenon and ensure the preservation of the integrity, defence, and security of the organization. Moreover, the security of every European citizen is a continuous concern of the European Union, which is why the European Parliament has set the following objectives[24]:

- *New laws needed to enable a robust response*
- *Protect elections from Russian interference*
- *Support EU-associated countries and Western Balkans*

The European Parliament, which has condemned Russia for its growing disinformation, condemns the as *"the main source of disinformation in Europe."*[25] The gravity of Russia's propaganda campaigns *"which seek to undermine the foundations and principles of European democracies as well as the sovereignty of all Eastern Partnership countries"*[26], led Members of the European Parliament to gather the leaders of each EU Member State to develop *"a robust legal framework at both EU and international level to tackle hybrid threats."* [27]

Established in 2015, the East StratCom Task Force represents a structure of the European-External Action Service, specially designed for the false information content spread by Russia over the years. Members of the European Parliament *"call for social media companies, messenger services, and search engine providers to be regulated by law"*[28] and require local authorities to publish political content online. To understand the purpose of this structure, it is necessary to answer some questions about it.

The main objective of the structure is *"to develop communication products and campaigns designed to better explain EU values, interests and policies in the Eastern Partnership countries."*[29] In other words, the objective of the East StratCom Task Force is to conduct a complex analysis of fake news. Basically, it *"reports on and analyses*

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[24] Homepage of European Parliament. URL: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190307IPR30695/eu-prepares-itself-to-fight-back-against-hostile-propaganda. [31-10-23].
[25] Homepage of European Parliament. URL: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190307IPR30695/eu-prepares-itself-to-fight-back-against-hostile-propaganda. [31-10-23].
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Homepage of European External Action Service. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/questions-and-answers-about-east-stratcom-task-force_en. [31-10-23].

*disinformation trends, explains and exposes disinformation narratives, and raises awareness of the negative impact of disinformation that originates in pro-Kremlin sources and is disseminated in the Eastern neighbourhood's information space and beyond.*"[30] Furthermore, it is important to know that this structure within the EEAS does not work alone; it cooperates with *"EU institutions, EU Delegations, Member States, and a wide range of other partners, both governmental and non-governmental, within the EU, in the Eastern Neighbourhood, and beyond."*[31]

In conclusion, the "team" of the European Union relies on cooperation and support in combating the constantly rising phenomenon of "fake news". The European Parliament has well understood the dangers of disinformation, which is why it has developed various structures and plans against fake news, mainly aimed at ensuring a world where justice and freedom thrive, providing safety for European citizens.

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[30] Ibid.
[31] Ibid.

# 9. Discussion of Results (pros and cons) and personal Conclusions

In this paper, I presented some aspects of the "fake news" phenomenon and the severity of the negative effects caused by it. I started by defining hybrid warfare from several perspectives, given that it is an environment where the phenomenon of "fake news" can be encountered. Then I defined this process of spreading fake news in the vision of the European Union, continuing with the current state of research, highlighting the missing piece of this research process, and continued with some discussion about how the European Union reacts to the phenomenon of "fake news".

The methodology used sums up all the directions I adopted in writing the paper. Figures and images were also employed in order to illustrate the concept of disinformation/misinformation. The most generous chapter of the paper provides pertinent answers to the research question and bring relevant arguments based on tangible evidence, so that the reader has a consistent basis for documenting the disinformation process. All comments, analyses, and arguments used in the current paper are based on data, documents, statistics, and reports, which highlight the European Union's involvement in combating the phenomenon of "fake news".

The mission of the European Union and its structures is well consolidated, and the institution is aware of the disastrous effects that the disinformation process can cause. Through various tactics, action plans, etc., the European Union's main objective in this field is to provide citizens with a safe and truthful world where their rights are respected and protected.

Moreover, most people have access to the Internet, which is why online space is a consistent source of information (or misinformation). The instrument launched at the initiative of the European External Action Service, "EUvsDisinfo", is, in my opinion, an effective way of shedding light on the truth. All citizens can access this tool, which takes the form of a website and contains many cases of disinformation detected by the European Union.

From my point of view, social media represents the most dangerous way of spreading information. The younger generation is very involved in online activities. Different studies carried out at the European Union level demonstrated that in the previous year, 2022, *"96 % of young people in the EU made daily use of the internet, compared with*

*84 % for the whole population.*"[32] In addition, as illustrated by the statistics below, it appears that social networks are the most often used in the European space.

**Young people's internet use in the EU, selected indicators, 2014-2022 (%)**



**Figure 8:** Graph of EU-specific percentage of Internet use[33]

In light of the presented challenges and dangers generated by the phenomenon of "fake news", I believe that stricter control over content published on social networks is essential. Since the break of the war in Ukraine, a lot of battlefield videos have been shared on different social media platforms like TikTok, YouTube, etc. Given the strong impact of such content on the viewers and the negative consequences of disinformation, such practices need to be better regulated by the authorities in charge in order to effectively combat the phenomenon.

Summing up the arguments presented above, I could conclude that the European Union fights for a world of truth and security, acting through different mechanisms. However, each individual should be responsible for their own safety. Moreover, if every European

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[32] Homepage of Eurostat. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Main_Page. [01-11-23].

[33] Homepage of Eurostat. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Figure_6_Young_people%27s_internet_use_in_the_EU,_selected_indicators,_2014-2022_(%25)_.png. [01-11-23].

voice were actively involved in combating the spread of fake news, the European Union and the world itself would be a much safer and truthful place.

# 10. Annexes

## 10.1 List of Abbreviations

- CSDP
- EU
- e.g.
- etc.
- Ibid.
- i.e.

## 10.2 List of Figures

- 1, Post shared by Thierry Breton regarding illegal content shared on Twitter, P.
- 2, Excerpt from the letter signed by Thierry Breton for Elon Musk, P.
- 3, Elon Musk's response to Thierry Breton's request, P.
- 4, Comparison between a real referendum and a sham referendum, P.
- 5, Initial moment of the disinformation process triggered by Russia against Ukraine, P.
- 6, Cases of spreading fake news at Russia's initiative, P.
- 7, Kremlin leader's harsh words to Ukraine, P.
- 8, Graph of EU-specific percentage of Internet use, P.

## 10.3 List of Literature

- Action Plan Against Disinformation. (2019).
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# 11. Affidavit

I declare that I have written the present essay independently and on my own. I have clearly marked any language or ideas borrowed from other sources as not my own and documented their sources. The essay does not contain any work that I have handed in or have had graded as a previous scientific paper earlier on.

I am aware that any failure to do so constitutes plagiarism. Plagiarism is the presentation of another person's thoughts or words as if they were my own – even if I summarise, paraphrase, condense, cut, rearrange, or otherwise alter them.

I am aware of the consequences and sanctions plagiarism entails. Among others, consequences may include nullification of the essay, exclusion from participation in the CSDP Olympiad. These consequences also apply retrospectively, i.e. if plagiarism is discovered after the essay has been accepted and graded. I am fully aware of the scope of these consequences.

Signature

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(Cadet Corporal Iulia-Karina Pop)

Sibiu, Romania in November 2023